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Regan attempts to move the reader from a commit
ment to the respectful treatment of humans to a like
commitment to the respectful treatment of normal
adult mammals. (Regan 1983) Regan points out that
we do not in general think it justifiable to harm one
human to benefit others-we would object, for example,
to killing a healthy man against hjs will in order to
use his organs to save three sick people. We do,
however, think it appropriate to harm one animal to
benefit other animals, human or otherwise; at least this
is the way that vivisection, hunting, and animal farming
are usually justified.
Regan argues that we are being inconsistent in
treating humans and other mammals differently in this
respect. The notion of inconsistency here is not self
contradiction but contradiction with the formal principle
of justice, according to which like individuals should
be treated alike. Now we protect humans against being
vivisected, fanned, or hunted, presumably because such
treatment would harm them through the infliction of
pain and death. But Regan has shown in the first three
chapters of his book that pain and death are also harms
to normal adult mammals. So these animals are just as
deserving of protection from vivisection, farming, and
hunting as are humans. Because both humans and other
mammals are harmed by pain and death. the two groups
are relevantly similar, and we are inconsistent to treat
them so differently.

Carol Gilligan bas described justice and caring as
two distinct moral frameworks or orientations to ethical
concerns. (Gilligan 1982) The justice framework is
characterized by abstraction, the application of general
rules ofconduct, an emphasis on restraining aggression,
and a concern for consistency and the fair resolution of
conflicting claims and interests. The caring framework,
on the other hand, is characterized by its focus on the
concrete and particular, its emphasis on the maintenance
and extension of connection, and by its concern for
responsiveness and the satisfaction of needs. Animal
liberation is often framed as a justice issue, though, I
will suggest, it may more appropriately be understood
in terms of caring.
By "animal liberation" I mean opposition to
institutions of animal exploitation such as vivisection,
hunting, and animal farming. Two prominent
philosophical defenders of animal liberation are Tom
Regan and Peter Singer. Both work exclusively within
the justice framework, presenting animal liberation as
a matter of consistency and fair treatment, rather than
in terms of responsiveness and the satisfaction of needs.
We can start to see how the justice approach is ill-suited
for animal liberation by considering the arguments of
Regan and Singer.
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interests of nonhumans much less consideration than
the similar interests of humans. This devaluation of
interests solely on the basis of species Singer calls
"speciesism," and he thinks his argument shows that
we are inconsistent to oppose sexism and racism but
not speciesism.
As with Regan, however, anyone willing to accept
a Kantian view can reject Singer's entire argument
without inconsistency. Singer presumes tl:tat opposition
to sexism and racism must be based on the principle of
equal consideration of interests. One could maintain,
however, that sexism and racism are objectionable
because they are disrespectful of the rationality of
members of the oppressed races and sex. One could
then consistently exclude nonhumans from moral
consideration, by holding tl:tat they lack the rational
capacities of humans.
Again I emphasize that I am not endorsing
Kantianism here. I am just showing that Regan's and
Singer's arguments fail on their own terms. Both writers
insist that they are relying on reason alone, and not
emotion, to establish their animal liberationist
conclusions. But the crucial step in their arguments,
tl:tat humans and other animals are relevantly similar,
cannot be established by reason alone.
Regan and Singer have the following response for
Kantian rebuttals of their arguments. (see Singer 1975,
Regan 1979, Singer 1990) Taking rationality as a
necessary condition for moral considerability does give
one permission to harm animals (if rationality is defined
narrowly enough). But it also gives permission to harm
many nonrational humans, such as infants, mentally
retarded individuals, and people with brain damage or
in comas. Thus, a commitment to protect these so-called
"marginal cases" of humanity entails the rejection of
Kantianism and the adoption of some more inclusive
criterion of considerability. But any criterion broad
enough to include marginal humans (e.g., sentience or
subjectivity) will also include nonhuman animals and
thus support animal liberation.
This line of thought, called "the argument from
marginal cases," is no more successful than Regan's
and Singer's main arguments in proving that animals
have rights. On the one hand, the argument may be
circumvented simply by giving up the commitment to
protect marginal humans. R. G. Frey does this. He takes
the marginal cases argument to present a dilemma: either
oppose animal vivisection or condone the vivisection
of marginal humans. (Frey 1983:97) He then reasons:

The flaw in this argument I wish to emphasize is the
move from same kinds of harms to relevant similarity.
Most of us would admit that pain and death are harms
for both humans and other animals. But this by itself
does not show that humans and other animals are
relevantly similar with respect to assessing the moral
status of these common harms. Regan allows that certain
capacities may be unique to humans, and it is
conceivable that the presence of uniquely human
capacities in an individual is relevant to the justif:tability
of harming that individual, even when the type of harm
in question is one which can be imposed on nonhumans.
In fact, according to Kantian theories, only rational
individuals can be directly wronged. A Kantian could
hold that killing is a harm both to humans and other
animals, but tl:tat the wrongness of the harm arises only
from its impingement upon the victim's rationality.
Thus, killing a rational human would require special
justification not needed for killing a nonrational anin:tal,
even though both are harmed by being killed.
I am not saying that I agree with Kantianism or
with the idea that there are uniquely human capacities.
I am only saying that as long as Regan's readers are
willing to embrace these theories, they can without
inconsistency reject Regan's move from "death and pain
are harms for both humans and other animals" to "killing
and inflicting pain require the same justification for both
humans and other animals." Since this move is crucial
to his argument as a whole, they can consistently reject
Regan's case for animal rights. 1
Essentially the same type of maneuver allows
rejection of Singer's argument for animal liberation.
Like Regan, Singer attempts to move the reader, through
considerations of consistency, from commitments
concerning the appropriate treatment of humans to
similar commitments concerning the appropriate
treatment of animals. (Singer 1975, chapter 1) Singer
starts not with respect for humans but with opposition
to racism and sexism. Singer argues that anyone who
opposes racism and sexism does so on the basis of a
principle of equal consideration, according to which
we must give equal consideration to the interests of all
people, regardless of their race or sex. But animals, at
least all those capable of feeling pleasure or pain, have
interests, so there is no reason, according to Singer,
why they should be excluded from the scope of this
principle of equal consideration. But animal farming
and vivisection, Singer maintains, are considered
acceptable practices only because we tend to give the
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any unavoidable inconsistency in supporting the
exploitation of animals in vivisection and in farming
while rejecting any similar exploitation of humans.
Animal liberation is not a matter of consistency.

[V]ery few people indeed would look in the
face the benefits which medical research in
particular has conferred upon us, benefits
which on the whole have most certainly
involved vivisections .... [11berefore, we may
fmd ourselves unable to make the choice in
favour of antivivisectionism .... Accordingly,
we are left with human experiments. I think
this is how I would choose, not with great glee
and rejoicing, and with great reluctance; but
if this is the price we must pay. to bold the
appeal to benefit and to enjoy the benefits
which that appeal licenses, then we must, I
think, pay it. (Frey 1983:97)

As arguments, justice-based approaches to animal
liberation fail. The justice orientation also fails to
capture the moral outlooks of many in the animal
liberation movement. Justice-oriented writers cast the
issue as, fundamentally, a comparison between the
treatment of humans and the treatment ofother animals.
According to Regan, we harm animals to benefit others,
we do not do this to humans (generally speaking), but
there is no relevant difference between humans and
animals to justify the dissimilar treatment. Thus animals
are treated unfairly by comparison to the treatment of
humans. For Singer, the comparative unfairness is in
opposing sexism and racism but not opposing
speciesism, when again there is no relevant difference
between humans and other anim~ls to support the
distinction. For both Regan and Singer, and other writers
within the justice framework, the basic moral judgment
concerns the discrepancy between the treatment of
humans and the treatment ofother similar animals. What
is called into question is the fairness, or what they more
often refer to as the consistency, ofa society which treats
two relevantly similar groups of individuals in such
totally different ways.
The emphasis on the consistency of the agent and
the focus on comparing the treatment of humans and
the treatment of other animals are quite distant from
my motivations and those of others in the animal
liberation movement. My opposition to the institu
tionalized exploitation of animals is not based on a
comparison between human and animal treatment but
on a consideration of the abuse of the animals by itself.
I respond directly to the needs and the plight of the
animals used in vivisection, bunting and farming. In
objecting to these practices I am not comparing the
treatment of humans and animals and thinking "this is
unfair because humans are protected from such usage."
I am appalled by the abuses in aud of themselves
shooting, trapping, and poisoning; branding, castrating,
forcibly impregnating, separating mother and young,
tail docking, debeaking, confining, transporting in cattle
cars, and slaughtering; burning, cutting, gassing,
starving, asphyxiating, decapitating, decompressing,
irradiating, electrocuting, freezing, crushing, paralyzing,
amputating, excising organs, removing parts of the

Frey forgets that "we" academics, presumably
(hopefully?) escaping classification as marginal, would
not be the ones to pay the real price for a choice in
favor of vivisection.
Even those of us not quite able to match Frey's noble
sacrifice of other humans to vivisection can still
consistently evade the marginal cases argument, if we
are so inclined. Suppose we '1ustify" the vivisection of
animals by reference to their supposed lack ofrationality.
And suppose we allow that some humans also lack this
rationality. This does not imply that we must vivisect
marginal humans, only that we may. Thus, the protection
of marginal humans could be made consistent with the
vivisection ofanimals possessing comparable degrees
of rationality by interpreting that protection as
supererogatory. According to this line ofthought we may
vivisect marginal humans, because, like nonhuman
animals, they lack a right to protection, butfor nonbinding
reasons we decide only to vivisect the nonhuman animals.
This stratagem is employed by Bonnie Steinbock:
I am willing to admit that my horror at the
thOught of experiments being performed on
severely mentally incapacitated human
beings in cases in which I would find it
justifiable and preferable to perform the same
experiments on non-human animals (capable
of similar suffering) may not be a moral
emotion. But it is certainly not wrong of us to
extend special care to members of our own
species. (Steinbock 1978:256)
So like their main arguments, Regan's and Singer's
backup argument from marginal cases fails to show
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liberation is often based. Consider the following
statements by people who do support animal liberation,
either partially or completely:

brain, socially isolating, inducing addiction, and
imposing disease-these acts are repellant because of
what they do to the animals. My moral condemnation
of the acts arises directly from my sympathy for the
animals, and is independent of the question of
whether humans are protected from such abuse. To
the extent that humans are also treated in these ways I
object to that, too, but again, out of sympathy and not
considerations of fairness.
Let me give some examples of discourse which
clearly show the sort of direct responsiveness I am
talking about. A 1983 study on the psychology of
slaughter contains quotes from college students who
worked on a farm as part of their curriculum. One
19-year-old woman wrote:

[T]he production-line maintenance of animals,
... is without a doubt one of the darkest and
most shameful chapters in human culture. If
you have ever stood before a stable where
animals are being fattened and have heard
hundreds of calves bleating, if you can
understand the calf's cry for help, then you
will have had enough of those people who
derive profit from it.
I eat meat but rarely veal ... I could never
bring myself to slaughter a cow. This is very
difficult to do to any animal that one bas taken
care of for a long time. (Lorenz 1988:113)

The first time 1 went into the slaughter room I
had just haltered and pulled a steer into the
waiting line. I could tell that the steer sensed
what was going to happen to him. He was
doing anything to get away. Then when I
walked to the slaughter.room I was amazed at
the amount of blood. It was an awful feeling
to look at that steer with its eyes open and his
feet pointing up, so I had to look at the ceiling.
Mr._ told me to cut off the head with a saw.
I couldn't do it so I left. I guess slaughtering
affects me more than the usual person because
I raised calves for 4-H at home and became
. quite attached to them-but I don~ butcher
them. (Herzog & McGee 1983:129-30)

Ninety percent of all pigs are now raised in
indoor, near-dark, windowless confinement
sheds.... I respond on an emotional level with
horror at what each individual pig is subjected
to and sympathize with each pig, whose
extreme sociability is evidenced by these
animals' increased popularity as pets .... As a
lactating mother, I empathize with the sow
whose reproductive freedoms have been
denied and whose nursing experience seems
so wretched. As a consumer and a vegetarian,
I visualize this information when I witness
people buying or eating "bam," "bacon," or
"sausage." (Adams 1991:134)

A 19-year-old man wrote:
I was one morning, while studying alone in
the Natural History Museum, suddenly
disturbed by a frightful burst of screams, of a
character more distressing than words can
convey, proceeding from some chamber on
another side of the building. I called the porter
in charge of the museum, and asked him what
it meant. He replied with a grin, "It is only the
dogs being vivisected in Monsieur Beclard's
laboratory." ... Therewith he left me, and I sat
down alone and listened. Much as I had heard
and said, and even written, before that day
about vivisection, I found myself then for the
first time in its actual presence, and there swept
over me a wave of such extreme mental
anguish that my heart stood still under it.. ..

It's pretty gross. I don't like having the dry
heaves all day. Plus, I feel really bad for the
cow. It's bad seeing a big animal turned into
hamburger. (Herzog & McGee 1983: 130)
The reactions described here are not comparative
judgments of justice such as, "cutting off this steer's
head is wrong because we don't do that to humans,"
but, rather, revulsion at bloodshed, pity for an animal
struggling for his life, memories of animal friends, a
sense of the loss and the waste of "a big animal turned
into hamburger"--all elements of caring. Now these
students do not identify themselves as animal
liberationists, but the reactions they describe do not
differ essentially from the reactions on which animal
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I will now describe why they believe this and why I
think they are mistaken.
Regan questions whether an ethic of care can "go
far enough." (Regan 1991:95) He asks:

And then and there, burying my face in my
hands, with tears ofagony I prayed for strength
and courage to labour effectually for the
abolition of so vile a wrong, and to do at least
what one heart and voice might to root this
curse of torture from the land. (Anna
Kingsford, quoted in Vyvyan 1988:122-23)

[W]hat are the resources within the ethic of
care that can move people to consider the
ethics of their dealings with individuals who
stand outside the existing circle of their valued
interpersonal relationships?... [U]nless we
supplement the ethic of care with some other
motivating force-some other grounding of
our moral judgment-we run the grave risk
that our ethic will be excessive} y conservative
and will blind us to those obligations we have
to people for whom we are indifferent
Nowhere, perhaps, is this possibility more
evident than in the case of our moral dealings
with nonhuman animals. The plain fact is, most
people do not care very much about what
happens to them ....
And thus it is that a feminist ethic that is
limited to an ethic of care will, I think, be
unable to illuminate the moral significance of
the idea that we (human) animals are not
superiortoallotheranimals. (Regan 1991:95-6)

No comparisons of human and animal treatment, or
fixation on one's own consistency; upon seeing or
hearing how the animals are abused, there is an
immediate reaction directed against that treatment,
and based on that reaction, a moral judgment and
decision to act.
In response to the criticism that their justice
approach misses the fundamental importance of direct
sympathetic responsiveness in the actual motivations
of activists, Regan and Singer could point out that their
work is not descriptive but nonnative, that is, that they
are not trying to describe animal rights activists and
their psyches (ala Susan Sperling (1988) or Keith Tester
(1991)) but, rather, to set out the best reasons we have
for accepting the animal rights position. Such a response
would be inadequate in two ways. First, it is doubtful
that justice-based arguments do present the best reasons
for animal liberation, given that those arguments are
unsound, as I have shown above. More importantly, this
response would incompletely characterize the projects
Singer and Regan take for themselves, since, besides
attempting to construct sound arguments, both writers
explicitly indicate that they also want to further the
animal liberation movement. This second part of their
project, I would suggest, makes it incumbent upon them
to attend to the actual motivations of activists.
Arguments with little relation to the ethics of those who
already affmn animal liberation are unlikely to bring
new people into the movement or to help present
activists maintain their commitment. Those of us who
write or speak to move others should make presentations
consonant with the real processes by which individuals
come to reject animal farming, vivisection, and hunting.
In fact, Regan and Singer believe that they are
taking these processes sufficiently into account in
constructing their justice-based arguments. Each
believes that sympathetic responsiveness to animals
is an insufficient basis for the development of an
animal rights perspective in most individuals. They
feel that justice-based argumentation, or what they call
"reason," is necessary to augment people's sympathies.
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To remedy this supposed limitation ofthe caring approach
Regan suggests the marshalling of "consistency"
arguments such as those I have already discussed.
Singer does "not think that an appeal to sympathy
and goodheartedness alone will convince most people
ofthe wrongness of speciesism." (Singer 1975:255) He
places his distrust of the caring approach within a
sociobiological framework. In The Expanding Circle
(Singer 1981), be argues that humans are disposed
towards kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, and group
altruism, and that these dispositions can be explained
in evolutionary terms. Singer sees the capacity to reason
and the practice of reason-giving as evolving
independently of the evolution of our sympathetic
dispositions. Reason, however, can act to override
narrow sympathies, to expand our considemtion beyond
that yielded by kin, reciprocal, and group altruism.
Singer argues that
altruistic impulses once limited to one's kin
and one's own group might be extended to
a wider circle by reasoning creatures who
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can see that they and their kin are one group
among others, and from an impartial point
of view no more important than others.
(Singer 1981:134)

impel their interlocutors to animal liberation through
charges of inconsistency. This is precisely Regan's and
Singer's justice-based strategy.
Now, I can understand how one might conclude
that people do not care about animals, given the
existence of such horrendous institutions as vivi
section, factory farming, and sport bunting. Regan's
and Singer's accounts, however, involve an overly
simplistic understanding of the limitations of people's
sympathies. For Regan it is a "plain fact" that people
do not care about animals, while for Singer it is a
genetic fact. On the contrary, I contend that this state
of affairs is not "plain" but rather ornate, and it is not
genetic but socially constructed. Animal exploitation
thrives not because people fail to care but in spite of
the fact that they do care.
The disposition to care for animals is not the
unreliable quirk ofa few, but is, rather, the normal state
of humans generally. AsAndree Collard puts it: "Our
common bond with animals is natural (of nature),
normal (of the norm), and healthy (wholesome)."
(Collard 1989:70) If we shift our attention away from
animal exploitation to other cultural phenomena, we
can see the strength and depth of the human-animal
bond. I will just mention four examples.

So, for Singer, humans have evolved instinctive
capacities to respond sympathetically only to a few
individuals closely similar to or associated with
themselves. Therefore reason, in the form of the
principle of equal consideration of interests, must be
applied for consideration to be extended to other clans,
races, and species.

(1) Pet-keeping. The practice of keeping animals as

companions, in its cross-cultural prevalence and
its frequently avid pursuit, demonstrates the
strength and depth of human interest in and
affection for nonhuman animals. Approximately
half ofall contemporary Americans and Europeans
have pets at any given time. Many theories of pet
keeping downplay affectional ties, instead
characterizing pets as, for example, status symbols
or objects ofdomination. While this may accurately
characterize some human-pet relationships,
companionship and affection are by far the most
important elements motivating pet-keeping in our
society. In one survey, for example, pet-owners
ranked companionship, love and affection, and
pleasure, respectively, as the top three "advantages"
of owning a pet. (Quigley, et a/1983:271) And as
James Serpell has shown, the common practice of
pet-keeping among tribal cultures, like pet-keeping
in industrial Europe and America, is characterized
by strong affection for pets, great efforts to keep
pets, and views of pets as family and community
members. (Serpell1986, chapter 4)

Given their low estimation of the human capacity
to sympathize with nonhumans, we can understand why

Regan and Singer might feel that their justice-oriented
approaches to animal liberation are essential. If people
do not care for animals, then supporters of animal
liberation cannot presume that such affections are
present in those they are trying to persuade. At best,
they can assume the presence of some concern for
humans and use this concern as a fulcrum, trying to
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victim's ear: "This deed was done by all the gods; I
did not do it" (168); the Nuer people of the Sudan
justify their consumption of cattle blood by claiming
that periodic bleeding is beneficial to the animals'
health (153), while the Ainu of Japan also claim to
benefit the bears they eat, by maintaining that bears
want to return to the spirit realm from which they
came (148). Western civilization bas its own
expiatory myths, most outstandingly the biblical
fable of divinely granted dominion over animals,
and the scientific denial of animal subjectivity
(originally expressed as Cartesian animal autom
atism, now more circumspectly maintained as
operational behaviorism).

(2) Therapy. Many people either socially withdrawn or
in depressed states have been helped through the
companionship of animals. These people were
unable to interact positively with other humans
but could establish a connection with a friendly
animal, often a dog or a cat. (see Beck & Katcher
1983, chapter 8) This reinforces what most of us
already recognize, that bonds with animals are
sometimes easier to establish and maintain than
bonds with humans.
(3) Rescue. You may recall from 1988 the plight of three
California gray whales off the coast of Point Barrow,
Alaska. The ice-boles through which the whales
were surfacing to breathe were in the process of
freezing over; which would result in the whales
drowning. A rescue attempt was mounted, which
ultimately cost $5.8 million and directly involved
all the following: local subsistence whalers,
professional biologists, environmental activists, 150
journalists, the oil industry, U.S. National Guard,
and the American and Soviet federal governments.
(Rose 1989) If we ask why the rescue was pursued
atsuch great lengths, a cynical answer in terms of
the self-interest of the participants would be to some
extent correct But to leave it at that would give a
very superficial and distorted understanding of the
final cause of the rescue. The participation of these
groups in the whales' rescue served their interests
only by virtue of a deep and widespread concern
for the whales' well-being among people generally.
The media, for example, cannot play to emotions
people do not have: whale rescues boost ratings
because people care about whales, especially whales
that have become individualized through their
special circumstances.

All these rituals and myths serve in some way to
reduce the guilt-feelings of those who harm animals.
The general occurrence of guilt-mediating mechanisms
around systems of animal exploitation contradicts the
notion that humans are naturally ~ndifferent toward
animal welfare. People are generally inclined against
harming animals: otherwise, there would be no need
for social mechanisms which make killing somewhat
more bearable-the exploitation of animals would be
as psychologically straightforward as, say, drinking
water or breathing air.
Attention to social phenomena such as pet-keeping,
animal rescues, therapeutic human-animal relationships,
and the ubiquity of expiatory mechanisms around
animal exploitation brings a realization of the depth
of the human-animal connection. This realization
shifts the question, from Regan's and Singer's "How
can we get people to oppose animal exploitation, given
that they don't care?" to "How does animal exploi
tation continue, given that people do care?'' The
answer I would give to this latter question is that
animal exploitation continues with great difficulty.
Enormous amounts of social energy are expended to
forestall, undermine, and override our sympathies for
animals, so that vivisection, animal farming, and sport
bunting can continue.
Let me mention just a few of the myriad practices
our society has developed to overcome opposition to
harming animals.
There is a great deal of concealment and distortion
of what is done to animals in laboratories and on farms.
Vivisectors self-consciously conceal the effects of their
activities from the public, through such measures as
removing the vocal cords of vivisected dogs (so their

(4) Expiation. James Serpell describes the almost
universal presence, in cultures which hunt or
slaughter animals, of mechanisms for mediating the
guilt which such exploitation engenders. (Serpell
1986: chapters 10 and 11) Mechanisms which
soothe the consciences of those who harm animals
take many forms. Consider the following: many
African tribes perform elaborate cleansing and
purification ceremonies after killing an animal,
others apologize to the slain (Serpell 1986:145);
ancient Babylonian priests, as part of the rite of
animal sacrifice, would whisper in the slangbtered
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vivisected animals from taking a political stand against
animal exploitation. 2
Finally, numerous systems of reward and punish
ment insure that complicity with animal exploitation
takes precedence over compassion. Children who are
aghast at discovering the true origin of meat are forced
by their parents to continue eating the dead flesh;
aspiring vivisectors fmd that the lure of professional
acclaim and financial comfort overcomes their initial
inhibitions against killing and imposing disease; and
slaughterhouse employees, hating every minute on the
job, stomach it when no other jobs pay decent wages.
(see Thompson 1983)
To sum up: Justice-based arguments for animal
liberation fail. But my own experience and the reports
of others lead me to believe that direct responsiveness
to need is more central to animal liberationism than
concerns about consistency anyway. And contrary to
the suppositions ofjustice-oriented writers, the capacity
to respond to animals is a deep and recurring feature of
humans. That is precisely why societies which
institutionalize animal exploitation must and do find
ways to override our sympathetic capacities, or to
prevent their actualization.
The lesson I draw from this analysis is twofold, part
heartening and part sobering. Heartening is the
realization that the ethical basis of animal liberation is
very simple and generally moving. A straightforward
presentation of what the animals are like and what is
done to them on the farms and in the labs can stir people,
especially if the ideologies which block sympathy are
simultaneously debunked.
But sobering is a grasp of the nature of the social
forces allied against a true perception of animals, against
an understanding of what is done to them, against the
possibility of acting from compassion. The substantial
power of institutionalized animal exploitation sustains
ignorance, promotes fear, rewards cruelty, and punishes
kindness. So, though the ethics of animal liberation are
inherently appealing, the obstacles placed in the way
of radical social change based on sympathy are
daunting. This is not to say that those obstacles are
insurmountable. Moving away from unsound and
irrelevant justice-based arguments, taking instead a
caring perspective which expects a human-animal bond,
and which challenges any hindrances to this natural,
normal, and healthy bond, allows us to continue moving
toward a society in which animals have been liberated
from human tyranny.

tortured howling does not attract sympathy) and
disposing of carcasses surreptitiously. Special
terminology blunts awareness of what is done, such as
"terminate," "dispatch," and "sacrifice" for killing. The
meat industry also employs euphemisms, preferring, for
example, "meat-packing" to "slaughtering." And the
images of farm life presented in advertising and
children's books consistently show contented animals
living in harmony with human guardians, rather than
the nightmarish reality of the factory farm and the
slaughterhouse.
Beyond obscuring what is done to animals, there
are also social mechanisms for negating the existence
of the animals themselves. I have already mentioned
the denial of animal subjectivity which has become
intrinsic to scientific "objectivity." Our everyday
language also removes the individual intentionality of
exploited animals from awareness, through terms such
as "livestock" (meaning "animals ... for sale and
profit"-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary), and
"game" ("animals ... pursued or killed in sport").
Animals referred to by such terms have come to be
defined solely in terms of the purposes of their human
exploiters. It is now of the essence of a "guinea pig" to
be vivisected. This denial of the animal's own purposes
is sometimes purposefully advocated:
Forget the pig is an animal. Treat him just like
a machine in a factory. Schedule treatments
like you would lubrication. Breeding season
like the first step in an assembly line. And
marketing like the delivery of finished goods.
(Hog Farm Management, Sept. 1976. Quoted
in Mason and Singer 1990:1)
Apart from devices which prevent sympathy, such
as denying animal subjectivity or covering up bow
animals are harmed, there are also social mechanisms
for overriding those sympathies which do become
engaged. Perhaps the most potent of these is the
myth of necessity-the idea that we must exploit
animals for our own well-being. Both the meat industry
and the vivisection industry actively promote the
notion that they are serving essential human interests.
Their largely false teachings-that human health
depends upon programs of animal vivisection, and
that meat, eggs, and dairy products are good for
you-generate the kind of fear that prevents even
those disturbed by the harms done to farmed and
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Notes

Robbins, John. 1987. Dietfor a New America. Walpole, NH.:
Stillpoint Publishing.

should note that Regan does not neglect this response
to his argument: section 5.5 of his book is a rejection of
Kantianism. Close examination, however, reveals that his
argument against Kantianism is question-begging. See this
author's doctoral dissertation.

Rose, Tom. 1989. Freeing the Whales: How the Media Created
the Worlds Greatest Non-Event. New York: Birch Lane
Press.

1I

Serpell, James. 1986. In the Company ofAnimals: A Study of
Human-Animal Relationships. New York: Basil
Blackwell.

2 Convincing arguments that these are false appear in
Sharpe (1988) and Robbins (1987).

Sharpe, Robert. 1988. The Cruel Deception: The Use of
Animals in Medical Research. Wellingborougb, England:
Thorsons Publishing Group.
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